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Defense lawyers practicing law in the State of Montana are
indeed fortunate. They work with the Montana Code of Criminal
Procedure' -one of the most advanced and far reaching codes avail-
able to the defendant in the United States. The Montana Code
provides the defendant with broad powers which allow him to have
virtually complete pre-trial discovery and inspection of all evidence
which may or may not be used against him. Thus, it could be stated
that the defendant charged with a crime in the State of Montana
has discovery powers which parallel the broad powers afforded both
the plaintiff and defendant in civil actions in the State of Montana
and under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A defense attorney
handling a criminal case in the Federal system, however, will find
considerable limitations on the availability of pretrial discovery by
the defendant, and, in some cases, virtually no availability of pre-
trial discovery.
The general procedure in federal courts is for the defense coun-
sel to file a motion for a bill of particulars or for pre-trial discovery
and inspection. Rule 7(f) and Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure provide such an avenue. The motion for discovery is
based upon the following constitutional requirements:
1. The defendant must be adequately apprised of the nature
and scope of the accusations against him as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment;2
2. The defendant must have an opportunity to adequately
prepare his defense; 3
3. Prejudicial surprise must be avoided at the time of trial;'
4. The issues must be clarified so that confusion and delay
will be avoided at the time of trial;5
5. The defendant must be protected against a second prosecu-
tion for the same offense as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment;'
6. Materials believed to be in the exclusive control and posses-
1. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, §§ 95-1801 to 95- 1806 (1947).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932); Application of Kaufman, 136 F. Supp.
626, 629 (D. N.J. 1955).
4. United States v. Glaze, 313 F.2d 757, 759 (2d Cir. 1963).
5. United States v. Ketchum, 320 F.2d 3, 8 (2d Cir. 1963).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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sion of prosecuting authorities and, thus, unavailable to the defen-
dant, must be made available to said defendant;7
7. The defendant must be afforded due process as guaranteed
to him by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments;8
8. The defendant must be afforded the right of effective con-
frontation against his accusers as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendments;9 and
9. The defendant must be afforded his right to effective aid
and assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. I"
This article discusses first some general legal principles con-
cerning the defendant's discovery rights based on the constitutional
guarantees listed above and the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of these guarantees. It looks especially closely at the
Court's interpretation of the due process clause, from which the
Court has found a basis for many of the defendant's discovery
rights. The article also sets out the American Bar Association's
standards on the prosecution's obligation to disclose information to
the defendant. Next, the article examines the legal authority for
specific information which the defendant's counsel may discover
from the prosecution, based on the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure and court decisions interpreting discovery rights under those
rules. Finally, an appendix is included to provide R model set of




The fundamental principles of criminal law in the American
system are set out in the United States Constitution in the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments. The first principle is stated in the Sixth
Amendment:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall ... be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation ... (Emphasis supplied.)"
This Constitutional principle is deeply rooted in the history of crim-
inal law, based upon the reasoning that in order for a person to be
able to defend himself against any charge, he must first know the
7. United States v. Reed, 43 F.R.D. 520 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
8. Powell v. Alabama, supra note 3 at 67.
9. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420 (1964).
10. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444,446 (1960).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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nature and the cause of the accusation. If the defendant is unaware
of what is said against him, is unaware of the time and place that
the accusation is made, and is unaware of the material facts upon
which the prosecution intends to rely, how, then, can he adequately
prepare his defense or even have knowledge of what defenses may
be available on his behalf?
The remaining tenants of the Sixth Amendment are more so-
phisticated principles:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall . .. be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense."2
The courts have construed these tenants to require "effective" con-
frontation of witnesses, 3 "effective" compulsory process for obtain-
ing witnesses, 4 and "effective" assistance of counsel for his de-
fense. 5 A defendant may rely on these principles in his discovery in
federal criminal cases. If the prosecution refuses to disclose informa-
tion requested in a motion for a bill of particulars, it is obvious that
the defendant would be denied "effective" confrontation of wit-
nesses and "effective" assistance of counsel.
Although the Sixth Amendment refers directly to criminal
prosecutions, much of the case law that applies to criminal discov-
ery rights has appeared under the Fifth Amendment. This trend has
occurred because the Bill of Rights has been held generally not to
be incorporated into the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and thus not applicable directly to the states." It
should be noted however, that a denial of the rights embodied in the
Sixth Amendment, may, in specific instances, operate to deprive a
defendant of due process of law. 7 In contrast, the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment is embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment
and is binding upon the states and state law. The fifth Amendment,
in part, states: "No person shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."
B. Supreme Court Interpretations
Under the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, the United States Supreme Court has developed two
12. Id.
13. Douglas v. Alabama, supra note 9 at 420.
14. Taylor v. United States, 329 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1964).
15. Avery v. Alabama, supra note 10 at 446; Powell v. Alabama, supra note 3 at 71.
16. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
17. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461 (1941).
1975]
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principle rules concerning discovery rights of the defendant in crimi-
nal cases. The landmark decision of Brady v. State of Maryland ,"
established that the prosecution may not hide or fail to disclose
favorable information to a defendant charged with a crime. 9 The
corollary to this rule was established earlier in Napue v. Illinois"o
which stated that if the state allows false evidence to go uncor-
rected, there is a denial of due process for the defendant.2'
A prelude to the Brady case appeared in two Pennsylvania
cases in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit ruled that the prosecutor's 'failure to disclose exculpatory
materials can be, under certain circumstances, a denial of due pro-
cess.2 2 In United States v. Baldi,2 the petitioner sought habeas cor-
pus on the grounds that he was denied due process of law where, in
a prosecution for murder of a policeman, the state suppressed evi-
dence tending to show that the petitioner did not fire the fatal shot
and evidence that the shot was, in fact, fired by a policeman. The
suppression of this evidence, although not relevant on the question
of guilt, was relevant to the penalty to be imposed. The Court
stated:
We think that the conduct of the Commonwealth as outlined in the
instant case is in conflict with our fundamental principles of lib-
erty and justice. The suppression of evidence favorable to Almeida
was a denial of due process .2
In another Third Circuit case, United States v. Dye25 also a
petition of habeas corpus, the petitioner has been convicted of first
degree murder. The petitioner contended that the prosecution had
improperly supressed testimony of the police officers to the effect
that the petitioner was under the influence of alcohol at the time of
his arrest. The court concluded that this was, in fact, a denial of due
process since intoxication has a bearing upon the degree of guilt.26
In Brady, the Supreme Court specifically stated that the Baldi
and Dye cases "state the correct constitutional rule. '2 7 The Court,
relying on the due process clause, ruled as follows:
18. Brady v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
19. Id. at 87.
20. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
21. Id. at 269.
22. United States v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3rd Cir. 1955); United States v. Baldi, 195 F.2d
815 (3rd Cir. 1952).
23. United States v. Baldi, supra note 22.
24. Id. at 820.
25. United States v. Dye, supra note 22.
26. Id. at 767.
27. Brady v. State of Maryland, supra note 18 at 86.
[Vol. 36
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We now hold that suppression by the prosecution of evidence fa-
vorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. . . . A prosecution
that withholds evidence on demand of the accused which, if made
available, would tend to exculpate or reduce the penalty helps
shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant. That casts the
prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not
comport with standards of justice, even though, as in the present
case, his action is not 'the result of guile,' to use the words of the
Court of Appeals. 8
It must be understood that Brady acknowledged the prosecu-
tion's advantage in a search for evidence by reason of the special
powers it possesses." For instance, there are many occasions when
witnesses feel obliged to talk to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
or the police, but will not talk to defense counsel. Furthermore,
witnesses who are not inclined to speak to either side can be forced
by the state to testify before a grand jury under the compulsion of
subpoena. These discovery devices, of course, are not available to
the defense. The imbalance of these investigatory facilities inevita-
bly harms the defendant and can lead to an ill-prepared defense,
and, therefore, an unfair trial. It was this obvious inequity that led
to the decision in Brady.
Another prelude to Brady and the corollary to the Brady princi-
ple, came in Napue where the Supreme Court decided that a lie
told by a governmental witness which did not concern any of the
facts of the case, but involved his credibility, tainted the conviction
and necessitated a new trial. The goverment witness in Napue testi-
fied that no one had promised him consideration for his testimony,
when in fact an assistant district attorney had made such a promise.
The Court, in scalding language, denounced the government for this
failure of disclosure and reversed Napue's conviction. 3'
Recently, the Supreme Court reinforced the Napue holding in
Giglio v. United States.2 In a situation almost identical to Napue
the Court reprimanded prosecutors for not divulging a witness's
known false testimony. The prosecution acknowledged that an as-
sistant United States Attorney had promised the witness he would
not be prosecuted if he cooperated, but the assistant who tried the
case pleaded that he was unaware of that promise. The Court, in
rejecting this excuse, emphasized:
28. Id. at 87.
29. Id. at 88.
30. Napue v. Illinois, supra note 20.
31. Id. at 270-272.
32. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1970).
1975]
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The prosecutor's office is an entity and, as such, it is the spokes-
man for the government. A promise made by one attorney must be
attributed, for these purposes, to the government.33
Thus, Giglio expanded the frontiers of Brady and Napue by
bringing within its scope the principle that the state cannot stand
by and allow false testimony to go uncorrected, even though unsoli-
cited, and cannot escape the responsibility of the action of one attor-
ney in the United States Attorney's office, even though disavowed
by another.
The Brady and Napue doctrines have been further explained in
Moore v. Illinois.3 1 In this leading decision the Supreme Court re-
viewed a murder case arising in Illinois. The petitioner, convicted
of the shotgun slaying of a bartender, contended he was denied due
process because the state failed to disclose a favorable pre-trial
statement and a diagram demonstrating that a key government
witness could not have seen the shooting. The Court, dramatically
divided, rejected the petitioner's Brady claim, holding that in light
of all the evidence, the misidentification of the petitioner by only
one witness was not material to the issue of guilt.3 5 Significantly, the
prosecution had "presented its entire file to the defense, and no
further request for disclosure was made. ' 3 The Court made clear its
intention to adhere to the principles of Brady and Napue, but felt
"that the present record embraces no violation of those princi-
ples. ' ' 31 However, the Court did reshape the Brady rule somewhat
by stating:
The heart of the holding in Brady is the prosecution's suppression
of evidence, in the face of a defense production request, where the
evidence is favorable to the accused and is material either to guilt
or to punishment. Important, then, are (a) suppression by the
prosecution after a request by the defense, (b) the evidence is of a
favorable character for the defense, and (c) the materiality of the
evidence .38
It becomes apparent that the evidence suppressed must be re-
quested by defense counsel. Thus, it is imperative that the defense
counsel be very thorough in asking for all information that may have
any effect on the outcome of his case.
Some prosecutors and courts have formed the habit of using the
word "exculpatory" in defining Brady material. Although that word
33. Id. at 154.
34. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
35. Id. at 798.
36. Id. at 794.
37. Id. at 798.
38. Id. at 794.
[Vol. 36
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was used in the Brady opinion, the restatement of the rule in Moore
clearly relates to "favorable" evidence. Obviously, there is a vast
difference between favorable evidence and that which is exculpa-
tory.
A last comment should be made on the Moore decision. The
majority opinion drew an infuriated dissent from Justice Marshall,
joined by Justices Douglas, Stewart, and Powell. Marshall ex-
claimed:
There can be no doubt that there was suppression of evidence by
the state and that the evidence the state relied on was "false" in
the sense that it was incomplete and misleading.39
Later in the dissent, Justice Marshall elaborated:
My reading of the case leads me to conclude that the prosecutor
knew that evidence existed that might help the defense, that the
defense had asked to see it, and that it was never disclosed. 0
C. American Bar Association Standards
The prosecution's obligation to disclose has been further de-
fined by the American Bar Association, which has followed the
Brady principle, both in its project on Standards for Criminal Jus-
tice4' and in its Code of Professional Responsibility. 2 The Standards
for Criminal Justice relating to discovery and procedure before trial
state as follows:
2.1 Prosecutor's obligation.
(c) Except as is otherwise provided as to protective orders
(Section 4.4), the prosecuting attorney shall disclose to defense
counsel any material or information within his possession or con-
trol which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the offense
charged or would tend to reduce his punishment therefor.
(d) The prosecuting attorney's obligations under this section
extend to material and information in the possession or control of
members of his staff and of any others who have participated in
the investigation or evaluation of the case and who either regularly
report or with reference to the particular case have reported to his
office. 3
The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility
speaks to the prosecutor's obligation to disclose information in both
39. Id. at 808.
40. Id. at 810.
41. AMERIcAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY
AND PROCEDURE BEFoRE TAL (1969).
42. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF ETHICAL
STANDARDS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969).
43. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 41 at 53.
19751
7
Kampfe and Dostal: Discovery In The Federal Criminal System
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1975
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
its ethical considerations and disciplinary rules under Canon 7. The
ethical consideration states:
EC 7-13. The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from
that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely
to convict. This special duty exists because: (1) the prosecutor
represents the sovereign and therefore should use restraint in the
discretionary exercise of governmental powers, such as in the selec-
tion of cases to prosecute; (2) during trial the prosecutor is not only
an advocate but he also may make decisions normally made by an
individual client, and those affecting the public interest should be
fair to all; and (3) in our system of criminal justice the accused is
to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts. With respect to
evidence and witnesses, the prosecutor has responsibilities differ-
ent from those of a lawyer in private practice: the prosecutor
should make timely disclosure to the defense of available evidence,
known to him, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, miti-
gate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment. Further,
a prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence
merely because he believes it will damage the prosecutor's case or
aid the accused." [Emphasis supplied.]
Finally, the disciplinary rules state:
DR 7-103(B). A public prosecutor or other government lawyer in
criminal litigation shall make timely disclosure to counsel for the
defendant, or to the defendant if he has no counsel, or the existence
of evidence, known to the prosecutor or other governmental lawyer,
that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree
of the offense, or reduce the punishment. 5
In conclusion, under the legal principles that have been enacted
into the Federal Constitution, established by the Supreme Court of
the United States, and have been adopted by the American Bar
Association, it can be seen that a defendant's motion for a bill of
particulars should be granted for almost any information that will
be helpful to the defendant.
LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR DISCOVERY
A. Federal Rules
Rule 7(f) and Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure provide the avenues for discovery by the defendant's attorney
in federal criminal cases. Rule 16, on discovery and inspection, is
fairly specific. Subsection (a) provides that the court may order the
government's attorney to permit the defendant to inspect and copy:
44. AMEmicm BAR AsSOCxIrON, supra note 42 at 79.
45. AMERIcmA BAR ASSOCIATION [, supra note 42 at 87.
[Vol. 36
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(1) written or recorded statements made by the defendant; (2) re-
ports of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or
experiments made in connection with the case; and (3) recorded
testimony of the defendant before a grand jury. Subsection (b) of
Rule 16 provides for discovery by the defense attorney of books,
papers, documents, tangible objects, buildings or places, which are
in the control of the government, upon a showing of materiality to
the defense.
In contrast to Rule 16's specificity is Rule 7(f)'s generality. Rule
7(f) merely states that a court may direct the filing of a bill of
particulars. It gives no description or limitation of any type of the
areas of inquiry a bill of particulars may cover. Exactly what a bill
of particulars is and its scope of inquiry have been defined by case
law. Because its scope is apparently unlimited under the Federal
Code, a vast area of inquiry may be achieved with a motion for a
bill of particulars in federal criminal cases.
A bill of particulars is a procedural document complementary
to the pleading. It is a statement containing a more specific allega-
tion of the facts than is recited in the pleading. Its purpose is to
amplify or limit a pleading, to specify more minutely a claim or
defense, to give information not contained in the pleading to the
opposite party, or to apprise the opposite party of the case he must
meet." To these ends, the trial may be limited to the matters speci-
fied in the bill of particulars. The scope of the bill should ordinarily
be limited to such matters as are required to enable the moving
party to properly prepare his responsive pleadings and to generally
prepare for trial." The granting or refusal of a motion for a bill of
particulars rests in the sound discretion of the court."8
Federal courts are excercising their discretion to grant bills of
particulars more freely, and many have enlarged the scope of infor-
mation available through this device. This trend has been especially
marked in conspiracy cases and other complex cases such as income
tax evasion and fraud prosecutions. Although even courts gener-
ously disposed to grant a bill will not "force the government to
reveal its entire case, or all of the evidence it hopes to adduce at
trial," there is increasing recognition that "any information which
elaborates on the nature of the offenses charged is likely to itself
constitute evidence" and a bill should not be denied for that reason
alone."
The remainder of this article deals with specific areas of inquiry
46. United States v. Anderson, 254 F.Supp. 177, 180 (W.D. Ark. 1966).
47. Ritchie v. Atlantic Refining Co., 7 F.R.D. 671, 677 (D. N.J. 1947).
48. United States v. Baggett, 455 F.2d 476, 477 (5th Cir. 1972).
49. United States v. Tanner, 279 F.Supp. 457, 473 (N.D. 111. 1967).
1975]
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to which courts have held that a motion for a bill of particulars
should be granted. These areas of precedent are intended to comple-
ment the model set of inquiries, which is included in the appendix




C. Interviewers, not Witnesses
D. Interviewers
E. Statements or Evidence of the Defendant




J. Knowledge of Relevant Facts




It has been held that a motion for a bill of particulars should
be granted to disclose the time and place of the alleged offense.2
Also, the means employed to commit the alleged offense is discover-
able through particulars.5' In a multi-defendant case, a specification
of whether a defendant is charged as an aider and abetter, and, if
so, how he aided and abetted the alleged offense must be given.5" It
would seem that these motions obviously should be granted because
they follow so closely from the Sixth Amendment command that a
defendant shall be informed of the nature and cause of the charge
against him.
Co-Conspirators
A long line of cases have dealt with the problem of bill of partic-
ulars concerning conspiracy charges. It has been held that particu-
lars of the following character should be granted in conspiracy cases:
(1) when, where, and in what manner each defendant became a
50. United States v. Burgio, 279 F. Supp. 843, 846 (S.D. N.Y. 1968); United States v.
Lumboski, 277 F.Supp. 713, 719 (N.D. Ill. 1967); United States v. Smith, 16 F.R.D. 372, 375
(W.D. Mo. 1954).
51. United States v. Bel-Mar Laboratories, Inc., 284 F.Supp. 875, 888 (E.D. N.Y. 1968);
United States v. Burgio, supra note 50 at 846; United States v. Baker, 262 F. Supp. '657, 673
(D. D.C. 1966).
52. United States v. Baker, supra note 51 at 674.
[Vol. 36
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member of the alleged conspiracy; 3 (2) the names of all alleged co-
conspirators not named in the indictment but known to the prosecu-
tion;54 (3) all overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy not specified
in the indictment, on which the prosecution intends to rely;55 (4)
specification of the places at which overt acts were allegedly per-
formed;56 and (5) specification of the acts each defendant is alleged
to have personally performed.57 Again, it can be seen that these
requests for information are not requests for evidence in the hands
of the government, but more basically, they are requests for the
specific acts done which comprise the crime.
Prospective Witnesse
As to prospective government witnesses, some courts have been
hesitant in allowing discovery. The Brady decision requires only
that information helpful to the defense must be produced at the
appropriate time requested. This is in contrast to the disclosure
timetable of the Jencks Act,58 by which statements of witnesses to
be called by the government need not be disclosed until trial.
One rule has been definitely established in retionalizing this
dichotomy. The defendant has the right to know the names and
addresses of persons, known to the" government, who directly took
part in the alleged illegal act, and whether such persons were agents
of the government before trial.59 In this regard, it has been stated
that without definite specification of time and place of commission
of the overt acts complained of, and of the identity of the person or
persons dealt with, there may be some difficulty in preparing a
defense to the charges, and some danger of surprise. 0 Some courts,
however, have held that the prosecution is not required to disclose
the names and addresses of nonparticipating witnesses."
It may be argued that discovery should exist even as to wit-
nesses who did not participate in the crime itself. In Gregory v.
53. United States v. Tanner, supra note 49 at 474.
54. Id. at 475; United States v. Burgio, supra note 50 at 846; United States v. Pilnick,
267 F. Supp. 791, 801 (S.D. N.Y. 1967); United States v. Baker, supra note 51 at 673.
55. United States v. Tanner, supra note 49 at 475; United States v. Pilnick, supra note
54 at 801; United States v. Baker, supra note 51 at 673.
56. United States v. Tanner, supra note 49 at 476; United States v. Crisona, 271
F.Supp. 150, 156 (S.D. N.Y. 1967).
57. United States v. Tanner, supra note 49 at 476.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1970).
59. Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 61 (1957); United States v. Moore, 57 F.R.D.
640, 644 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
60. United States v. Smith, supra note 50 at 375.
61. United States v. Ely, 335 F.Supp. 353, 358 (N.D. Ga. 1972); United States v. Moore,
surpa note 59 at 644.
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United States,"2 the court stated:
Witnesses, particularly eye-witnesses to a crime, are the property
of neither the prosecution nor the defense. Both sides have an
equal right, and should have an equal opportunity to interview
them. 3
The defendant cannot compel a witness to submit to an interview
to which that witness objects. However, the defendant's attorney
has not only the right,64 but the duty to talk to the state's witnesses
before trial . 5 Thus, the defense attorney may find himself at a cross-
roads where, on one hand, he has the professional and legal duty to
interview the state's witnesses before trial, and on the other hand,
he is unaware of the names, addresses, or telephone numbers of
those witnesses. In the decision of United States v. Hardy,"6 the
district court allowed discovery of all persons having knowledge
pertaining to the case or who were interviewed by the prosecution
in connection with the case. The court explained its reasoning as
follows:
Absent a showing. . . abuses and the considerations noted by the
Advisory Committee, such as danger to witnesses, names and ad-
dresses of persons who have any knowledge pertaining to the case,
both those who will be called as witnesses and those who will not
are properly discoverable. . . . The necessity for discovery of
names and addresses of persons with knowledge of the case whom
the Government does not intend to call as witnesses may be even
greater than the discovery of the names of witnesses who will be
called. The former may have information favorable to the accused
and that information would not be discoverable under the Jencks
Act. Indeed, if discovery of names of non-witnesses with knowledge
of the cases were denied, an innocent defendant might never even
know of the existence of people who could save him from punish-
ment for a crime he did not commit.
Interviewees Who Might Not Be Called As Witnesses
Two areas of discovery in which much favorable information
may be made available to the defendant are interviewees who might
not be called as witnesses and their interviewers. Individuals who
62. Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
63. Id. at 188.
64. AmERIcAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, Canon 39
(1957).
65. Walker v. Superior Court, 155 Cal.App.2d 134, 317 P.2d 130, 134 (1957).
66. United States v. Hardy, (D. D.C., Cr. No. 869069, 1968).
[Vol. 36
12
Montana Law Review, Vol. 36 [1975], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol36/iss2/2
.FEDERAL CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
have been interviewed by the prosecution, but who will not be called
in the prosecution case can only be reasonably excused from testify-
ing at the trial on two grounds: (1) that they have no knowledge of
relevant facts; or (2) that their knowledge is in some manner favor-
able to the defendant. If the second reason is true, then under the
Brady doctrine that information should be made available to the
defense.
Contrary to what might be expected, courts have not generally
made information, which is not intended to be used at trial, discov-
erable to the defense. In Giles v. Maryland, 7 the United States
Supreme Court addressed the state's duty to disclose material facts
known to the state prior to trial, even if such facts might not be
admissible at trial. Four separate opinions were written in this case,
each rendering the same judgment, but giving different reasons.
Justice Abe Fortas considered this problem most closely.18 In his
opinion, Justice Fortas held that the state may not be excused from
its duty to disclose material facts known to it prior to trial solely
because these facts would not be admissible at trial. The ultimate
responsibility of the state under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, he held, is not to convict, but to see that truth
emerges. While he held that the state had no obligation to commu-
nicate preliminary, challenged, or speculative information, Justice
Fortas, in concluding his position, stated:
My point relates, not to the defendant's discovery of the prosecu-
tion's case for purposes of preparation or avoidance of surprise,
which is dealt with in Rule 16, but the State's constitutional duty,
as I see it, voluntarily to disclose material in its exclusive posses-
sion which is exonerative or helpful to the defense - which the
State will not affirmatively use to prove guilt - and which it
should not conceal .... 69
The reasoning of this opinion is most applicable to requests made
by the defendant for discovery of information which clearly would
be favorable to the defendant, but which would not be utilized by
the prosecution in their case in chief.
Simos v. Gray0 may also be used to support discovery of mate-
rials not to be used at trial. Here, the court held that where wit-
nesses identified the defendant from police photos six weeks after
the offense, the state had the duty to disclose police reports which
indicated that on the night of the offense witnesses declined to view
such photographs because they were sure they could not identify the
67. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
68. Id. at 96 to 102.
69. Id. at 101, 102.
70. Simos v. Gray, 356 F.Supp. 265 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
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burglar. Also, the police reports which showed that the witness
made a misidentification several days later, and that a witness gave
a physical description that varied from the description of the defen-
dant were held to be discoverable. The court stated that the fact
that the suppressed evidence tends only to rebut the state's case
rather than exculpate the accused directly still raises the degree of
prejudice necessary for reversal.'
In United States v. Ladd,71 the court allowed the motion calling
for statements of witnesses not proposed to be called by the govern-
ment which tend to exculpate the defendant, based on the reason
that there is no conflict with the Jencks Act and such statements
are clearly favorable to the defendant.
Statements or Evidence of Defendant
With respect to matters constituting a discoverable statement
of the defendant, a number of general principles have emerged. The
contents of the statement may be either inculpatory or exculpatory;
it need not be a confession or an admission of elements of the of-
fense. It is sufficient that the statement is relevant to the crime
charged.73 The statement need not be made to an agent of the gov-
ernment. Any statement, to whomever made, is discoverable.74 The
statement need not be made after the arrest of the defendant." The
statement need not be written out by the defendant or be a written
document signed by him. An oral statement recorded by mechani-
cal, electrical, or other means is discoverable.7" The statement need
not be a recital of past occurrences. It may, itself, constitute part
of the alleged offense or be made in the course of the commission of
the offense."
An oral statement of a defendant, recited or summarized in an
investigative report or the notes of a government investigator, ap-
pears to be discoverable without regard to whether it is verbatim,
only substantially verbatim, or when the report or notes were
made.78 Statements by the defendant to be used by the prosecution
are discoverable under Rule 16(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and thus one need not use a bill of particulars to request
such information. The rationale of allowing discovery of the defen-
71. Id. at 270.
72. United States v. Ladd, 48 F.R.D. 266, 268 (D. Ala. 1969).
73. United States v. Federman, 41 F.R.D. 339, 340 (S.D. N.Y. 1967).
74. United States v. Lubomski, supra note 50 at 720; United States v. Baker, supra note
51 at 671-672.
75. United States v. Leighton, 365 F.Supp. 27,34 (S.D. N.Y. 1967).
76. United States v. Lumboski, supra note 50 at 720.
77. United States v. Isa, 413 F.2d 244, 248-249 (7th Cir. 1969).
78. United States v. Morrison, 43 F.R.D. 516, 519 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
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dant's statements is that these statements may be very damaging
to the defendant and generally form the core of the prosecution's
case. Thus, it is necessary to supply the defendant with this infor-
mation.
Books, Papers, Documents, Tests and Tangible Objects
Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules provides for discovery by the
defense attorney of books, papers, documents, tangible objects, and
even buildings or places in control of the government, upon a show-
ing of materiality to the defense. It is plainly material and reasona-
ble for the defense to discover all documentary and other tangible
items referred to in the indictment or which form the subject matter
of the alleged offense, or which constitute its fruits or the means of
perpetrating said crime. Items such as an instrument a defendant
is alleged to have used in perpetrating a crime should clearly be
discoverable without question. As was stated in United States v.
Reed:79
We think the defendant should be afforded access to the docu-
ments, papers, and tangible objects which the Government intends
to introduce into evidence at trial. In an appropriate case, this
procedure could be not only beneficial to the defendant, but also
the court by streamlining the litigation in producing time saving
stipulations of fact between the parties, and indeed perhaps mak-
ing a trial unnecessary by pointing out to the defendant the enorm-
ity of the Government's case against him. 0
In this case, the court held that the government must disclose a
memorandum of a federal agent based on his recollection and notes
taken at an interview of the defendant. This document was ruled
to be included under Rule 16.
In United States v. Tanner,' the court directed the government
to permit copying of all documents turned over by the defendants
to the government. Even though the defendants made no showing
of "materiality" or "reasonableness," the court reasoning that these
items very likely would be material to the charges and fundamental
fairness required that the defendant have access to them. It must
also be noted that items discoverable under Rule 16 are not properly
requested through a motion for a bill of particulars, but only by a
motion for production of evidence favorable to defendant.82
Rule 16(a) also provides for discovery of the results of any scien-
79. United States v. Reed, supra note 7.
80. Id. at 65.
81. United States v. Tanner, supra note 49 at 468-470.
82. United States v. Ladd, supra note 72 at 267.
1975]
15
Kampfe and Dostal: Discovery In The Federal Criminal System
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1975
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
tific tests or experiments conducted by the government. The basis
for making this information available to the defendant is that it is
generally impossible for the defense to conduct such tests either
because the object of the test is not in his control or the defense does
not have recourse to the same testing facilities as the government.
Also, if the information was not provided, due to the technical na-
ture of the tests, the defense would be in no position to cross-
examine or confront the scientific tests or expert witnesses con-
nected with the tests. If the tests have been taken, but are not
planned to be introduced at trial by the prosecution, then it is very
likely that the tests would be favorable or exculpatory to the defen-
dant.
Impeachment, Conviction Records, and Deals Made
These three areas of inquiry are placed together because they
all are directed toward the credibility of witnesses who may be
called to testify against the defendant. The law is clear that all such
information should be made available to the defendant prior to the
time of trial.
In Giglio v. United States,8 the Supreme Court reversed a con-
viction and remanded for new trial a case in which a "deal" had
been made with one of the key witnesses against the defendant,
because the "deal" had not been brought to the attention of the
defense prior to the time of trial. The opinion of Chief Justice
Burger, which expressed the unanimous view of the Court, held that
the assistant U.S. Attorney's promise was attributable to the gov-
ernment, the agreement was relevant to the co-conspirator's credi-
bility and the non-disclosure of this evidence affecting the witness's
credibility violated due process.84 This same proposition was earlier
set forth in the Napuel5 case, where the Court ruled that the defense
counsel should be advised of "deals" made which might affect the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
From these decisions, it is clear that any material which affects'
the credibility of governmental witnesses is discoverable by the de-
fense and must be produced prior to trial. The information requests
in the areas of impeachment, conviction records, and "deals" will
affect the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses and, therefore,
should be made available to the defense.
83. Giglio v. United States, supra note 32.
84. Id. at 153-155.
85. Napue v. Illinois, supra note 30.
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Courts must hold prosecutors to their duty to conduct them-
selves as "the architects of a fair trial," rather than as advocates
privileged to win their cases by any means available. Civilized stan-
dards of justice should require the prosecution to reveal all evidence
which may be the least bit useful to the defense. Allowing prosecu-
tors and judges to decide what evidence will be helpful to the de-
fense significantly interferes with the determination of justice. In
most instances, the delivery of the requested evidence is not harmful
to the government; however, it is usually most helpful to the ac-
cused. Any withholding of favorable evidence from the defense is
unexcusable.
Today, the prosecution's monopoly of investigative agencies in
criminal cases means that a defendant faces a far more efficient fact
gathering adversary than he did a decade ago. The legal tools avail-
able to the prosecution far exceed those available to defense counsel.
Under these circumstances, the Brady doctrine, its corrolary in
Napue, and subsequent decisions have assumed great importance
in achieving a system of equivalent knowledge of the facts concern-
ing the criminal charges in criminal prosecutions. From the history
of the due process clause concerning criminal cases, it appears that
the scope of discovery available to the defendant will be extended
even further. Because of this, the bill of particulars is a valuable tool
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APPENDIX
MODEL SET OF INQUIRIES
A. CO-CONSPIRATORS
1. All statements made by the co-conspirators to prosecutorial
authorities regarding their involvement in the alleged conspiracy
and material facts relating thereto.
2. All statements made by the co-conspirators to prosecutorial
authorities regarding their lack of involvement in the alleged con-
spiracy and material facts relating thereto.
3. All statements made by the co-conspirators to prosecutorial
authorities regarding the involvement of defendant in the alleged
conspiracy and material facts relating thereto.
4. All Statements made by the co-conspirators to prosecu-
torial authorities regarding lack of involvement of defendant in the
alleged conspiracy and material facts relating thereto.
5. All recorded testimony of the co-conspirators taken at any
time or at any place before a jury and in a court of law.
6. All recorded testimony of the co-conspirators taken at any
time or at any place before a presiding judge in any jurisdiction,
including any admissions made by any co-consliirators in connec-
tion with a "guilty plea."
7. All statements made before a grand jury in any state court
relating to the alleged conspiracy.
8. All statements made to a grand jury in any Federal prose-
cution relating to the alleged conspiracy.
9. A list of any and all alleged agreements made by any co-
conspirators, including the defendant in furtherance of a common
plan to conspire to commit the crime.
(a) The names of all witnesses present at the time of any
alleged agreements;
(b) The addresses of all witnesses present at the time of any
alleged agreements;
(c) The exact time of any alleged agreements;
(d) The exact place of any alleged agreements;
(e) The exact date of any alleged agreements; and
(f) any and all statements taken in connection with any and
all alleged agreements.
10. A list of any and all overt acts which occurred after the
alleged agreements were made to conspire to commit the crime.
(a) The names of all witnesses present at the time of any
alleged overt acts;
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(c) The exact time of any alleged overt acts;
(d) The exact place of any alleged overt acts;
(e) The exact date of any alleged overt acts; and
(f) Any and all statements taken in connection with any and
all alleged overt acts.
11. A list of all statements regarding additional agreements or
follow-up agreements subsequent to the original agreement in re-
gard to the conspiracy to commit the crime.
(a) The names of all witnesses present at the time of any
alleged additional or follow-up agreements;
(b) The addresses of all witnesses present at the time of any
alleged additional or follow-up agreements;
(c) The exact time of any alleged additional or follow-up
agreements;
(d) The exact place of any alleged additional or follow- up
agreements;
(e) The exact place of any alleged additional or follow-up
agreements; and
(f) Any and all statements taken in connection with any and
all alleged additional or follow-up agreements.
B. PROSPECTIVE WITNESSES
1. A list of all witnesses which the prosecution intends to call
against the defendant at the time of trial.
(a) The addresses of all such witnesses; and
(b) The telephone numbers of all such witnesses.
2. A copy of all statements given by the prosecution's wit-
nesses which statements connect or tend to connect the defendant
with the alleged conspiracy to commit murder.
3. All exculpatory or favorable materials found in any state-
ment which might be favorable to the defendant in connection with
the charges filed against him.
4. All exculpatory or favorable materials secured by any pro-
secutorial authority which could be favorable to the defendant in
connection with the charges filed against him.
5. A list of all exhibits which the prosecution intends to intro-
duce at the time of trial.
(a) The name of the witness through which each exhibit will
be introduced by the prosecution at the time of trial.
C. INTERVIEWEES WHO MAY NOT BE CALLED AS
WITNESSES
1. A list of all individuals interviewed by any prosecutorial
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authority, even though they might not be called as witnesses against
the defendant.
(a) The addresses of all such individuals; and
(b) The telephone numbers of all such individuals.
2. A copy of all statements taken as a result of said interviews
by prosecutorial authorities.
3. A copy of all exculpatory or favorable statements which
have resulted from the interviews of said individuals, even though
the interviewees may not be called as witnesses against the defen-
dant.
4. A copy of all exculpatory or favorable materials in the pos-
session of prosecutorial authorities which may have resulted from
said interviews, even though the interviewees may not be called as
witnesses against the defendant.
D. INTERVIEWERS
1. A list of all individuals who have participated in the inves-
tigation of the crime.
(a) The addresses of all said interviewers; and
(b) The telephone numbers of all said interviewers.
2. A copy of all notes or statements secured by said interview-
ers which may be favorable or exculpatory to the defendant.
3. A complete statement of all material facts which were se-
cured by any and all such interviewers.
E. STATEMENTS OR EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT
1. A complete copy of all statements given by the defendant
to any or all prosecutorial authorities.
2. All recorded statements made by the defendant which may
be used against him.
3. A copy of all alleged verbal statements made by the defen-
dant to any person or persons which may be used against the defen-
dant at the time of trial.
4. A copy of all documents prepared by the defendant which
the prosecution intends to introduce at the time of trial.
5. A copy of all documents caused to be prepared by the de-
fendant or which were prepared under defendant's authority which
the prosecution intends to introduce at the time of trial.
6. The exact time, the exact place, the exact date and the
names of all witnesses present when any and all of the statements
or documents requested in Items 1 through 5 above were allegedly
made or given by the defendant.
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F. BOOKS, PAPERS, DOCUMENTS, TESTS AND TANGIBLE
OBJECTS
1. A list of all books, papers, documents, test results and tang-
ible objects which the prosecution intends to introduce into evi-
dence against the defendant at the time of trial.
2. A copy of all books, papers, documents, tests results and
tangible objects which the prosecution intends to introduce into
evidence against the defendant at the time of trial.
3. A list of all books, papers, documents, test results and tang-
ible objects which the prosecution does not intend to introduce into
evidence at the time of trial but which may be favorable or exculpa-
tory to the defendant and within the control of the prosecutorial
authorities.
4. A copy of all books, papers, documents, test results and
tangible objects which the prosecution does not intend to introduce
into evidence at the time of trial but which may be favorable or
exculpatory to the defendant and within the control of the prosecu-
torial authorities.
5. A list of all scientific tests conducted by the prosecutorial
authorities in the investigation of the crime.
(a) A copy of all such scientific tests;
(b) The name of the individual who performed each such
scientific test;
(c) The address of the individual who performed each such
scientific test;
(d) The telephone number of the individual who performed
each such scientific test;
(e) A copy of the results of each such scientific test; and
(f) A statement of whether or not the results of each such
scientific test will be introduced into evidence against
the defendant at the time of trial.
6. The names and addresses of any expert witnesses which the
prosecution intends to call against the defendant at the time of trial.
(a) A copy of the results of each such expert witness' tests,
investigations or opinions.
7. The names and addresses of any expert witness or expert
witnesses employed by the prosecutorial authorities but which the
prosecution does not intend to call against the defendant at the time
of trial.
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G. IMPEA CHMENT
1. A list of all witnesses who were interviewed by the prosecu-
torial authorities whose statements or testimony may tend to im-
peach or be inconsistent with the testimony of other witnesses who
may be called against the defendant at the time of trial.
(a) The address of each such witness;
(b) The telephone number of each such witness;
(c) The exact date and place that each such statement was
given by each such witness;
(d) The names of all individuals present when each such
statement by each such witness was given; and
(e) A copy of all statements of all witnesses interviewed by
prosecutorial authorities, which statements may tend to impeach
or be inconsistent with the testimony of other witnesses which the
prosecution may call against the defendant at the time of trial.
2. A list of all statements given at any time and at any place
before any court or any jury by any or all alleged co-defendants
which may be inconsistent with other statements given by any indi-
vidual co-defendant.
3. A copy of all statements given at any time and at any place
before any court or any jury by any or all alleged co-defendants
which may be inconsistent with other statements given by any indi-
vidual co-defendant.
4. A list of all individuals known to the prosecutorial authori-
ties who have committed perjury in connection with the crime.
(a) The address of each such individual;
(b) The telephone number of each such individual;
(c) The exact place where each such individual committed
by each such individual;
(d) The exact place where each such individual committed
said perjury; and
(e) A copy of any and all statements tending to prove said
perjury on the part of each such individual.
5. A copy of all inconsistent statements which may tend to
exculpate or be favorable to the defendant.
(a)- The name of each person giving such a statement;
(b) The address of each person giving such a statement;
(c) The telephone number of each person giving such a state-
ment;
(d) The location where each such statement was given;
(e) The date each such statement was given; and
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6. A list of all potential witnesses for the prosecution who have
been charged with the crime of perjury.
7. A list of all potential witnesses for the prosecution who have
been convicted of the crime of perjury.
(a) The date of conviction of each such potential witness.
H. CONVICTION RECORDS
1. A list of all potential witnesses for the prosecution who have
been convicted of one or more felonies.
2. A complete copy of the conviction records of all potential
witnesses for the prosecution.
3. A complete copy of the conviction record of the defendant.
I. DEALS MADE
1. A statement regarding all plea-bargin deals offered by the
prosecution to any alleged co-defendant or witness.
2. The time, date, place And persons present when each such
plea-bargain deal was offered to any co-defendant or witness.
3. A list of the number of times that any plea-bargain deal was
offered to any and all co-defendants or witnesses.
4. The results of any plea-bargain deals offered by the prose-
cution to any and/or all of the co-defendants or witnesses.
J. KNOWLEDGE OF RELEVANT FACTS
1. Provide a list of all individuals who have knowledge of rele-
vant facts in connection with the alleged crime.
(a) The address of each such individual;
(b) The telephone number of each such individual; and
(c) A copy of all statements given by each such individual.
K. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
1. Did the government utilize any wire-tapping, electronic
eavesdropping or interceptive devices of any nature in conducting
its investigation of this defendant or of any of the co-conspirators?
2. If the answer to Item 1 above is in the affirmative, please
indicate the time, date and place that said surveillance was con-
ducted and indicate the results thereof and in whose possession the
original or copies might be.
3. Does the government intend to introduce any evidence
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4. If the answer to Item 3 above is in the affirmative, please
state:
(a) The time, date and place any and all such searches and
seizures were conducted;
(b) The circumstances under which any and all such
searches and seizures were conducted;
(c) If a search warrant was involved in each such search and
seizure; and
(d) A copy of each such search warrant involved in each such
search and seizure.
L. MISCELLANEOUS
1. Has the prosecution conducted any pre-trial jury investiga-
tion?
2. If the answer to Item 1 above is in the affirmative, please
provide a copy of all results of said pre-trial jury investigation.
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